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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a legal malpractice case in which the underlying case involved Ronald Christian's 
representation of the Appellm1t in a criminal case. Appellant alleges that Mr. Christian was 
negligent in his representation of him in the criminal case. Mr. Christian alleged ncgligrnce is 
not at issue in this appeal, and is disputed by Mr. Christian. 1 Jn this case, Appellant simply filed 
his malpractice action against Mr. Christian well past the applicable statute of limitations. 
Idaho follows the "actual damage" rule as it pertains to when the statute of limitation 
accrues. ldaho requires that in a legal malpractice action arising from representation in a 
criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional element of 
actual innocence, as opposed lo legal innocence. 
There is no requirement in Idaho that a defendant obtain post-conviction relief in an 
underlying criminal case prior to filing a civil attorney malpractice case. Nor is the accrual of an 
attorney malpractice case impacted by a finding of "legal i1rnocencc" in Idaho. The District 
court applied the controlling law to the facts of the case and properly held that Appellant's claim 
is barred by the statute of limitation. 
Appellant does not dispute that the District Court followed controlling Idaho law in 
ruling on Mr. Christian's motion for summary judgment. Thus, Appellant cannot be heard to 
argue that the District Court's ruling was erroneous. See Appellant-Plaintiffs Opening Brief, 
1 Mr. Christian squarely disputes the factual allegations set forth in the PC Order of Judge Owen, and the Orders 
entered by Judge Norton, as the respective orders were entered without any response from Mr. Christian, were 
simply based on allegations of Appellant (not actual evidence), which are not relevant to the appeal before this 
Court. 
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p. 17. Rather, Appellant wants this Court to reverse and change the law in Idaho and adopt what 
is referred to as "the exoneration rule" to change the point at which the statute of limitations 
accrues on a malpractice action where the underlying representation was in a criminal matter. 
The only way Appellant can prevail on this appeal is if this Court ignores the statute that 
pertains lo the accrual of the statute of limitations in professional malpractice claims, and 




On June 29, 2007, Appellant was convicted by a Boise County jury on charges of lewd 
conduct with a minor. Mr. Christian represented Appellant in the trial of the case. 
On June 27, 2007, Appellant filed a motion for new trial in which he asserted that he had 
ineffective assistance ofcounscl. R., 000105 -107.2 
In addition, on October 3, 2007, Appellant, through then counsel Jeffrey McKinnie, filed 
a "Notice of Lodging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel." R., 000108 - 109. 
On October 5, 2007, Appellant filed an Amended Motion for a New Trial. R., 000110 -
111. 
Judge Carey denied Appellant's Motion for New Trial and specifically stated that 
ineffective assistance of counsel is not a ground for granting a new trial under ICR 34 and Idaho 
Code § 19-2604. 
2 Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the Idaho State Bar which contained similar allegations. 
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On May 23, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief; 
A1olen v. State o/Jdaho, I3oise County Case No.CV-2011-124. R.000118 - 144. In the Petition, 
Appellant asserted that botb Mr. Christian as trial counsel, and his appellant counsel, were 
respectively ineffective Specifically, Appellant asserted that "Mr. Christian did not move to 
continue or to dismiss based on the late disclosure of photographs taken during S.7 .. 's physical 
exam by Nurse Ortega." R. 000130. Appellant alleged "[tjhe limited time Dr. Friedlander had 
to review the photographs impacted the value oJ'his opinion ... " R. 000133. 
In the first cause of action in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed May 
23, 2011, Appellant alleged: 
Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of 
Strickland by failing to ensure that Nurse Ortega was 
interviewed prior to trial. Ilad Nurse Ortega been interviewed, 
she would have admitted that she took photos during her exam 
as she did during trial. Those photos would have then been 
obtained prior to trial for a careful and thoughtfol review by 
Dr. Edward Friedlander. Dr. Friedlander would have dcfeITed 
to a Master Pediatric Gynecologist and Mr. Molen would have 
been able to consult with and hire such a gynolocologist who 
would have testified. Because the prior opportunity to review 
the photos was not afforded to Dr. Friedlander, the prosecutor 
was able to discredit Dr. Friedlander's expertise and 
credibility. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this 
regard, the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of 
Strickland by failing to move to dismiss or to continue for 
failure to timely disclose the photos taken during Nurse 
Ortega's exam, which were material exculpatory evidence. 
Had such a motion been made, the case would have been 
dismissed or would have been continued and the additional 
investigation would have occuITed as described in the 
preceding paragraph. 
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R., 000139 - 140. 
On April I, 2013, Appellant, through appointed counsel, filed a Second Amended 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief, which alleged additional claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel against Mr. Christian. 
In Judge Owen's .hme 17, 2015 "Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Stipulation 
for Summary Judgment and Granting Post-Conviction Relief on Other Grounds" (hereinafter 
"PC' Order"), he stated that Mr. Christian's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel 
in the criminal trial of Appellant. R., 000038 - 64. The crux Judge Owen's basis for making this 
holding was his opinion that Mr. Christian's alleged "failure" to seek a continuance or a mistrial 
based upon the State's failure to disclose the existence of photographs of the colposcopic 
examination of the Victim, which photographs were disclosed to the defense for the first time at 
trial or take other measures to address additional issues in the case.3 
Judge Owen's opinion is entirely consistent with the allegations Appellant had been 
making against Mr. Christian since his conviction in 2007. That is, Judge Owen didn't tell 
Appellant anything - or give him notice of anything - that he hadn't himself been proclaiming 
since 2007; he would not have been convicted or damaged but for Mr. Christian's actions. 
Appellant filed the malpractice action against Mr. Christian subject of this appeal on 
February 17, 2015, nearly eight years after the statute of limitations began to accrue on his claim 
against Mr. Christian. 
3 Note that Appellant was not in favor of a continuance or mistrial, nor was Mr. Christian, for reasons not relevant to 
this appeal. 
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III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Mr. Christian is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred m defending this appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
IV. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
This Court applies the same standard as the district court when 
rnling on a motion for summary judgment. Wcscu !111/ohody 
Suppl)', Inc. v. Ernesl, 149 ldaho 881,890,243 P.3d 1069, 
1078 (2010). Summary judgment is proper if" the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The movant has 
the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact 
exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, l 49 Idaho 679, 
683, 239 l'.3d 784, 788 (2010). Disputed facts and reasonable 
inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 
213 (2010). This Court freely reviews issues of law. Lattin v. 
Adams Cnty., l 49 Idaho 497, 500, 236 P.3d 1257, l 260 
(20] 0). 
Soignier v. Fletcher, 256 P.3d 730, 151 Idaho 322,324 (2011). 
v. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil 
proceeding include: (I) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty 
on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the standard of care by the lawyer; and 
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(4) ihe failure to perform the duty must have been a proximate cause of the damages suffered by 
the client. A1arias v. A1arcmo, 120 Idaho I 1, 13, 813 P.2d 350,352 (1991). 
In a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant m a criminal 
proceeding. the person pursuing the claim must establish the additio1rnl clement of actual 
111nocrncc. J,amh v. Mom1•eiler, 129 ldaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996); see also Lamh 1•. 
Manweiler, Docket No 21266, ldaho Court of Appeals (1995)( ... "whcre one convicted of a 
crime sues for legal malpractice, contending that he would not have been convicted but for his 
aiiorney's negligent representation, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to the elements 
enunciated in Marias, the further clement that plaintiff is in fact innocent of the crime"). R., 
000147. 
"An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within 
two years after the cause of action accrued." 1/eyno/dy v. 7hmt Jones, 154 Idaho 21, 293 P.3d 
645 (2013), quoting Stuardv . .Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701,704,249 P.3d 1156, 1150 (2011). 
ldaho Code § 5-219 provides that "the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as 
of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not 
be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any 
continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged 
wrongdoer." Id, citing City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009). 
A cause of action cannot accrue until some damage has occurred. Buxton, supra. 
The legislature, in drafting and passing Idaho Code § 5-219, made no distinction as to its 
application in specific cases. That is, it applies to all cases of professional negligence. 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court did not error in applying controlling Idaho Law in 
holding that that statute of limitation on Appellant's cause of action 
accrued in 2007. 
Appellant argues that his cause of action did not accrue until his petition for post-
conviction relief was granted, which, per Appellant, was the date the tort was "complete": the 
date on which he could make a prima facic case for a malpractice claim. See Appellant-
Plaintiff's Opening Brief: pgs. 17 - 18. 
Idaho has no requirement that a claimant obtain direct or collateral relief from an 
underlying conviction lo start the accrual of the statute of limitation; or obtain the "grant" of 
legal innocence. 
As set forth above, Idaho law actually requires the proof of actual innocence in a 
malpractice claim in which the underlying claim is criminal, thus a ruling on legal innocence (i.e. 
obtaining post-conviction relief) is irrelevant. Following Appellant's "request" for this Cami's 
adopting of the "exoneration rule", a claimant would be barred from bringing a claim of attorney 
malpractice unless they filed a petition for post-conviction relief and relief was granted. Put 
another way, if a claimant's petition for post-conviction relief is denied, they are barred from 
bringing a negligence claim against their attorney. 
This Court has previously reviewed a plea for adoption of the exoneration rule in Lamb v. 
Manweiler, supra, and rejected it. Quite contrary to Appellant's representation that Lamb 
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supported the adoption of the exoneration rule, it certainly did no!. See J\ppellant-Plainlitrs 
Opening Brief, pg. 22. 
1. Proof of actual innocence is required iu au attorney malpractice 
case in Idaho, rendering the issue of legal guilt or innocence 
moot. 
Again, J\ppcllalc is advocating Iha! until a claimant his or her legal innocence, the statute 
oflimitations on a malpractice claim against their attorney docs not accrue. This argument is in 
direct conflict with existing law in ldaho which requires a claimant to establish their actual 
innocence, as established in Lamb v. J.1anll'ei/er, suprn. 
As Mr. Christian provided in briefing for the District Court, a brief history of the J,amb v. 
Mwmei/er is informative. 
The case was before Judge J. William liar! in J\da County. 
A concise statement of the facts of Manweiler was provided by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals: 
Sometime in 1989, Lamb was charged with a number of 
felonies related to his operations in the cattle industry. He 
employed attorney Howard Manweiler to defend him on these 
charges. As a result of plea negotiations, and upon 
Manweiler's advice, Lamb pleaded guilty to four felony 
charges, and the remaining counts were dismissed. After entry 
of the guilty plea but prior to sentencing, Manweiler 
discovered evidence that cast doubt on the underlying factual 
basis for two of the four charges to which Lamb had pleaded 
guilty. Thereafter, Manweiler filed on Lamb's behalf a 
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas on these two charges. The 
district court granted the motion. 
With respect to the two remaining counts for grand theft, 
I.C. § 18-2403(1), §-2407(1), Manweiler was of the opinion 
that he could not ethically present a motion to withdraw these 
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R., 000147-153. 
guilty pleas. Lamb therefore retained another attorney to 
present the motion for withdrawal of the two remaining guilty 
pleas, but the district court denied the motion. Lamb was 
ultimately incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional 
Institution for a period in excess of eighteen months on 
convictions for the two counts of grand theft. Lam filed an 
application for post-conviction relief pursuant to J.C.§ 19-
490 l ct seq., seeking to have the convictions set aside. That 
proceeding was dismissed, however, upon stipulation between 
Lamb and the State. 
In September 1992, Lamb filed the present civil action against 
Manweiler alleging professional malpractice in Manwciler's 
representation of Lamb in criminal matters .... 
l .amb alleged in his complaint in the malpractice case against Manweiler that "as a direct 
result of Defendant's negligence as aforesaid, the Plaintiff (Lamb) was incarcerated in the Idaho 
State Penitentiary." R., 000158. 
The parties acknowledged m Manweiler that the issue of Lamb's guilt "would he 
dispositive of the malpractice action; if plaintiff was in fact guilty of the crimes, any alleged 
negligence on the part of Mr. Manweiler would be of no effect and therefore proximate cause 
would not be established." R., 000173. 
On May 13, 1993, Manweiler filed a motion under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or alternatively a 
motion for summary judgment under l.R.C.P. 56(c), asserting that Lamb's case was barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations.4 In that motion, Manweiler also asserted that Lamb's claims 
4 Manweiler asserted that the applicable statute of limitation commenced upon the Court's acceptance of the Lamb's 
guilty plea (March 23, 1990); the date Lamb lost the presumption of innocence and his constitution right to a jury 
trial. The malpractice case wasn't filed September 4, 1992. Lamb argued that he didn't suffer "objectively 
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were barred because, based on admissions Lamb made in the underlying criminal case, he was 
estoppcd from asserting his actual innocence, which was a necessary element establishing 
malpractice where the underlying action was a criminal proceeding. R. 000164 - 16 7.' 
Judge Hart did not enter ruling on Manweilcr's statute of limitation argument. Instead, 
Judge I Tart ruled that Lamb failed to come forward with any fact to rebut the record setting forth 
his admissions of guilt before the Judge in the criminal proceeding, therefore, he could not 
maintain a malpractice claim against Manweiler. R., 000172 - l 76.6 Speci/Jcally, Judge I ]art 
held "if Mr. Lamb is guilty then the prima facie clement of proximate cause in Mr. Lamb's cause 
of action cannot be shown and his claim is without merit." R., 000175. 
Lamb appealed Judge Jlart's decision. Lamb asserted, in sum, that there were general 
issues of material fact regarding his guilt and/or innocence that precluded Judge Hart from 
granting Manweilcr's motion for summary judgment. Lamb again acknowledged in his appeal 
briefing that if guilty, it is this guilt, not any attorney negligence, that was the proximate cause of 
his incarceration. Lamb didn't assert (and never asserted), in response to Manweiler's motion, 
that he was actually innocent. 
In his Respondent's Brief, Manweiler argued that all Judge Hart was "confronted with is 
Mr. Lamb's unverified assertion that 'Defendant negligently advised Plaintiff that the guilty 
ascertainable damage" until he was denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, putting him inside of the 2 year 
statute oflimitations in Idaho Code§ 5-219(4). 
5 Lamb asserted that his claims were not barred by collateral estoppel because he was not given the opportunity to 
fully litigate his guilt or innocence in the criminal case. 
6 Judge Hart denied Manweilcr's initial motion for summary judgment, finding further discovery needed to take 
place with respect to Lamb's guilt or innocence. On renewed motion for summary judgment, Manweiler submitted 
several affidavits germane to this issue on which Judge Hart granted Manweiler's renewed motion. 
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picas should be entered and could be withdrawn at a later date." R., 00019 J. In sum, Manweiler 
argued that Lamb didn't establish a record from which Judge Hart could find an issue of material 
fact pertaining to his actual innocence. 
In ruling on Lamb's appeal, the Court of Appeals - on the issue of first impression in 
Idaho - that "actual innocence be pro\'cn as a prerequisite to recovery for negligent 
representation in a criminal case." Augmented Record, Opinion, p. 6 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals held "that where one convicted of a crime sues for 
malpractice, contending that he would not have been convicted but for his attorney's negligent 
representation, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to the clements enunciated in Marius, 7 their 
actual innocence. The Court of Appeals found that affidavits submitted in Lamb's post-
conviction proceeding controverted his guilt and created a genuine issue of material fact and that 
Judge Hart's opinion was in error. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded. 
On September 22, 1995, Manweiler filed a Petition for Review of the Court of Appeals 
decision based, in sum, on his arguments that the record in the underlying case "unequivocally 
established" that Lamb was not factually innocent of the underlying crimes. R., 000201 - 203. 
In the Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review, Manweiler asserted that 
"[ d]espite Lamb's conviction and his failure to obtain post conviction relief, [the Court of 
Appeals] held that evidence of statements made by Lamb during his post conviction relief action 
could be considered in creating a factual issue for purposes of denying summary judgment." R., 
7 Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P.2d 350, 352 (1991), the further element that the plaintiff is in fact 
innocent of the crime, their actual innocence. 
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000208. "This Court so held despite the facl, as the Court points out, that Lamb did not assert 
such statements in opposition to summary judgment before the district cow1 or the appeals 
court." Id. 
In this same Memorandum, Manweiler also slates: 
R., 000209." 
[t]he Court's admission of Lamb's statements during the post-
conviction proceedings and its reversal of summary judgment 
in view of Lamb's failure to obtain post conviction relief is 
against authority which holds that a criminal defendant who 
pleads guilty to the underlying criminal charges must 
successfully obtain post-conviction relief bcf'orc he can even 
file a legal malpractice action against his defense attorney. 
Connel r. J,wmey, 70 N.Y.2cl 169, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 
(1987); Shall' v. State, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991); Bailey v. 
Tucker, 533 Pa. 237,621 A.2d 108 (1993); Weiner v. Mitchell, 
Silvergerg & Knupp, 114 Cal. App. 3d 39, 170 Cal. Rptr. 533 
(1980). 
Lamb, in his Brief In Response to Petitioner's Brief, addressed Manweilcr's argument 
that the "Court of Appeals' decision is against the law because plaintiff, prior to initiating this 
malpractice suit, must "successfulJy obtain post-conviction relief..." R., 000217. Lamb goes on 
to state: "[t]hat is, defendant seeks a rule that post-conviction relief is a condition precedent to 
filing a malpractice claim arising from criminal advocacy." Id. Lamb acknowledged that 
"[p]ost-conviction relief does not resolve the guilt or innocence of the defendant; rather if relief 
8 In discussing Shaw v. State, supra, 816 P.2d at 1360, Manweiler states: "the Alaska Supreme Court held that a 
convicted criminal defendant must obtain post-conviction relief before pursuing an action for legal malpractice 
against his defense attorney." R., 000210. 
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is granted, the matter is reset for trial. Therefore, the granting of such relief is without resolution 
of the defendant's innocence, .. " R., 000219. 
Lamb went on to argue that "the Idaho Legislature cannot impose a heavier burden of 
proof upon one class of civil litigants (felons) than upon another class (non-felons): nor can the 
Legislature require on class of litigants to complete two separate pieces of litigation without 
imposing the same requirement upon the rest of its citizens. There is no justification for treating 
civil claimants differently from criminal claimants." R., 000225. 
In reply, Manweiler continued to make the argument that post-conviction relief was a 
prerequisite for a convicted criminal defendant to pursue a malpractice claim, citing, Stevens v. 
Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 562 (Or. l 993)(statute of limitations began to accrue when post-
conviction relief obtained). R., 000230 - 243. Manweiler urged the Court to adopt the 
"exoneration" rule, arguing "[s]cveral reasons support the adoption of the foregoing rule ... it 
would be inappropriate to allow malpractice actions unless it was shown that the attorney failed 
to meet the established standards in a way that would make post-conviction relief appropriate." 
R., 000235, citing Stevens, 851 P.2d 362. Manweiler rallied for the adoption of the exoneration 
rule stating "[t]he Stevens Court reasoning is equally applicable to Idaho's criminal justice 
system and this Court should adopt it." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court was not persuaded by Manweiler's arguments with respect to 
adoption of the exoneration rule, but nevertheless affirmed the district court's decision granting 
Manweiler's motion for summary judgment, finding "Lamb does not dispute the proposition that 
in a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in a criminal proceeding, 
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the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional clement of actual innocence of the 
underlying criminal charges." Lam/, v. Mcmweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 272, 923 P.2d 976, 979 
(1996). This additional clement of actual innocence of course was established in the earlier Idaho 
Comt of J\ppeals decision in the case, which was affomed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Idaho law, requiring proof of the addition element of actual innocence. is similar to the 
law in Washington. In Ang v. Martin, 76 P.3d 787 (Wash. J\pp. Div. 2, 2003), plaintiffs sued 
their attorneys who had represented them in their defense of criminal charges (prior to hiring 
new attorneys prior to trial) who were ultimately acquitted at trial. The plaintiffs in that case 
asserted that their acquittal proved their innocence in the malpractice action. The Court held that 
to "succeed on a claim of legal malpractice allegedly occurring in a criminal trial, a plaintiff 
must prove 'at a civil trial that he or she is innocent of the charged crime' and must do so by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Id at 790, citing Falkner v. Foshaug, 29 l'.3d 771 (2001 ). 
The Court's discussion in Falkner is helpful: 
A brief overview of other jurisdictions' treatment of criminal 
malpractice claims is instructive. First, many jurisdictions 
require that a defendant obtain post-conviction relief [b]efore 
initiating a malpractice claim, reasoning that it is inappropriate 
to treat victims of alleged negligence by defense counsel as 
having been harmed, for the purpose of maintaining a legal 
malpractice action . . . unless they show that their counsel 
failed to meet the established standards in a way that would 
make post-conviction relief appropriate ... Many jurisdictions 
require proof that the criminal defendant/malpractice plaintiff 
is innocent of the underlying criminal charges as an additional 
element of the civil malpractice claim. Only an innocent 
person wrongly convicted due to inadequate representation has 
suffered a compensable injury because in that situation the 
nexus between the malpractice and palpable harm is sufficient 
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to warrant a civil action, however inadequate, to redress the 
loss. 
[internal citations omitted]; see Wiley v. Co1111()! of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532, 966 P.2d 983, 
985-986 n. 2 (1998), Stevens v. lh1pha111, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556 (1993), A1organo v. Smith, 
110 Nev. 1025, 879 P.2d 735 (1994), Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995), 
Km111cr v. Kirkcnsen, 296 lll.App.3cl 819, 695 N.E.2d 1288 (I 998), <ilc1111 v. /J iken, 409 Mass. 
699,569 N.E.2d 783(1991), C:ar111el v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169,511 N.E.2d 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d 
605(1987). 
The distinction is, states such as Idaho require actual innocence as an clement of proof in 
an atlorney malpractice case, and states that follow the exoneration rule require a showing of 
"legal" innocence prior to allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a malpractice action; thus, 
exoneration is an element of proof in an attorney malpractice case in those states. Idaho has no 
such requirement. 
Despite extensive briefing by the parties m Manwciler,9 the Idaho Supreme Court 
considered but did not adopt the exoneration rule. Instead, the Court affirmed that in a legal 
malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in a criminal proceeding must 
establish actual innocence as an additional clement. See Appellant's Brief, pgs. 17 - 19. 
Notwithstanding whether the element of actual innocence is addressed by this Court, 
following Idaho law, Appellant's claim is barred by the statute oflimitations. 
9 This briefing included the cases relied upon by Molen in Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
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2. The statute of limitations commences upon a plaintiff incurring 
some damage. 
Appellant assert that his claim did not accrue until he received post-conviction relief, 
based on the notion that this Court should follow the exoneration rule pertaining to malpractice 
claims in which the underlying representation was in a criminal case. 
Tellingly, none of the statutes of limitation being interpreted by the "exoneration rule" 
states contain language similar to the ldaho statute. As set forth below, the language in the Idaho 
statute is very specific that the statute or limitations begins to accrue at the time the alleged 
actions arc committed. Also unlike Idaho, slates that follow the exoneration rule rely on a 
discovery rule or otherwise "hold" when a statue of limitation accrues, without more. 
This Court has specifically rejected the discovery rule in legal malpractice cases. See 
Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978). 10 
In Idaho, the statute of limitations accrues on a professional malpractice action when 
"some damage" has occurred. See e.g., Minnick v. Hawley 1,-oxell, et al, 341 P.3d 580 (2015). 
Appellant's argument that there was no objective proof of actual damage until Mr. Molen 
obtained post-conviction relief cannot be accepted by this Comi and is simply unbelievable. 
'° In 1971 the Idaho legislature amended Idaho Code § 5-219(4) to create two discovery exceptions, one for the 
leaving of a foreign object in a body, and the other for fraudulent concealment of a wrongful or negligent act of 
professional malpractice. Prior to 1971 this Court had created discovery exceptions in at least two cases. See 
Adams v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Idaho 1984). The first case was Billings v. 
Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485,389 P.2d 224 (1964). ln that case, this Court adopted the discovery rule 
pertaining to foreign objects being left in a patient's body. The other was Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 
P.2d 530 (1969). In Renner, this Court extended the discovery rule to cover medical misdiagnosis. The Idaho 
legislature adopted the Billings discovery rule exception, but not Renner. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16 
Appellant was convicted in 2007 and thereafter incarcerated. There can be no dispute that 
Appellant had objective proof of damage at that time. 
Judge Owen's order granting post-conviction relief has no bearing on whether Molen had 
"objective proof" that he had been damaged, nor did that order establish his actual innocence. It 
only established his legal innocence. Put another way, in ldaho, a finding of legal innocence 
triggers nothing; it is a finding that the effectiveness of the defendant's legal representation is 
sufficiently in question to grant a new trial. It has nothing lo do with when a criminal defendant 
suffered some damage, and certainly docs not trigger the accrual of the statute of limitation on a 
professional negligence claim, or toll that accrual. Judge Owen's order spoke to the issue of 
causation, not damages. 
In sum, Judge Owen's ruling has no bearing on this instant professional practice case 
whatsoever. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered ascertainable damage upon his conviction in 
June of 2007 and following. As set f011h above, Molen had been asserting that Mr. Christian's 
actions - those actions on which Judge Owen's post-conviction relief was granted - caused him 
damage, since the time he was convicted in 2007 and began filing post-trial motions. That is, 
Molen has asserted since he was convicted that he was damaged by Mr. Christian not moving for 
a new trial when evidence not disclosed by the state, was disclosed for the first time at trial. 
It is impossible that Molen could not have know he was damaged until after reading 
Judge Owen's PC Order, and Molen is clearly estopped from making such an assertion given his 
past causes of actions and filings as they relate to Mr. Christian. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17 
Nothing in Idaho law bars a plaintiff from a((empting to prove actual innocence in a 
malpractice proceeding, even if they are pursing or have received post conviction rel icf; 
notwithstanding whether they have been found "legally innocent." 
Idaho law docs not bar a plaintiff from filing a malpractice action within the applicable 
statute or limitation and moving for a slay of the proceedings pending the outcome of post 
conviction proceedings if they choose lo pursue such proceedings. 
1 lowcvcr, Idaho law does not allow a potential plaintiff to "toll" the statute or limitation 
until some prerequisite "event" occurs, or deem a cause of action "ripe" only upon the granting 
of post-conviction relief. 
Akin to medical malpractice, the statute of limitations for filing a professional medical 
malpractice claim is two years from the date the plaintiff has objectively ascertainable damage -
not the date the Idaho Board of Medicine finds a physician breach the applicable standard of 
care. 
Obtaining post-conviction relief is simply not an element of a malpractice claim in Idaho, 
and docs not serve to accrue the statute oflimitations for such a claim. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue before the District Court was when the statute of limitation for the instant 
attorney malpractice case accrued, and it accrued, as a matter of law, when Molen was convicted 
on June 29, 2007. The District Court's decision should be affirmed and Mr. Christian should be 
awarded his attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 18 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 19 
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